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A public choice model2
 Constraints and opportunities associated with the 
progression of an economy and its various industries have 
been evidently influenced by the political system and the 
public interests of the nation.  
 Indeed, dynamic interaction between social and public 
interests determines the industry’s evolving path, hence its 
changing performance over time.
1.Introduction
1.1 Background of study
 History of the political economy study
 Before the middle of the 20th century, economists were exclusively 
interested in exploring the role of government in protecting 
individuals and their property rights
 From 1950s, inspired by Arrow in his Social Choice and Individual 
Value (1951), researchers began to explore the formal and 
informal constraints of government’s decision-making process and 
the government failure caused
 Currently, New Political Economy assumed that the decision 
making process of a government is run by self-seeking politicians, 
whose interests are influenced by, but not necessarily identical to 
various interest groups
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 Nevertheless, none of them has ever explored the public 
decision making process for the legalization and progress 
of casino gaming
 It has been recognized as one of the faster growing global 
industries since the last decade of the 20th century
 Social and public choices, and their changes may exert higher 
weights in influencing the practice of casino gaming than economic 
interests
 Given the social interests, it is not necessarily identical to the 
public choices which ultimately determine the legal structure and 
organization of casino industry
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 Casino gaming is subject to the public choice on its 
legitimacy in the first place, which further shapes its layout 
 An attractive proposition of casino gaming is the attempt to grasp 
the explicit and considerable volume of economic returns, as well 
as to propel the development and redevelopment of various related 
sectors in the local economy
 However, an unique attribute of casino gaming is that in the 
process of providing related gambling services to the general 
public, various averse social impacts (including social costs) may 
be associated
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1.2 Factors influencing the public choice of casino gaming 
 The pubic choice of casino gaming in any one jurisdiction 
may also be influenced by the related public decisions in 
the neighboring regions/nations 
 For example, following the successful experiences as reported by
Las Vegas since its liberalization by the end of the 1960s, Atlantic 
City legalized its casino gaming in 1976
 Thereafter, more and more states in the US chose to legalize their 
own casinos, partly on the purpose to cannibalize the citizens’
gambling expenditures spent in other out-of-state casinos
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 It is evident that while public choice is in principle reflecting 
the social preference, it is not a static state and could be 
varied over time when either (or both) the internal or (and) 
external settings changed. 
 Following the Macao Special Administrative Region (SAR) 
Government of China liberalized its casino industry in 2002, and
the Singapore Government formally approved its casino bill in 
2005, it is evident that the related changes in the public interests 
towards casino gaming are diffusing to other Asian nations. 
1.Introduction
1.2 Factors influencing the public choice of casino gaming 
 Generally speaking, three major groups may participate in 
the public choice process of casino gaming
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1.2 Factors influencing the public choice of casino gaming 
 It is assumed that in the political process which determines 
the public choice of casino gaming, there are two major 
groups in actions – the anti-gaming (A) and the beneficiary 
group (B)
 It is assumed that there are a people in group A, and b people in 
group B . 
 If casino gaming is legalized, the income redistributed to 
each group are defined as
and
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 Generally speaking, legalization/liberalization of casino 
gaming increase the monetary income of the local 
economy to both group A and group B
 New business opportunities are generated
 The government may lower the direct and indirect taxations 
imposed to its citizens, as well as subsidize and provide more 
public services
 Non-monetary terms like the ethical and religious concerns 
may also take effect in the legalization process
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 It is firstly assumed that the expected benefit of group B to 
participate in the legalization process can be separated into 
two terms
 The expected utility when group B win (   )
 It is comprised of both monetary and nonmonetary terms
 The voting taste (   )
 It is independent from the voting result
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 The emotional benefit of group B could simply be 
expressed as the happiness to gamble, the easy access to 
good quality service, etc 
 Indeed, it could be stimulated by government signaling: If the 
government provides more clear signals for casino legalization, 
group B may be more incline to participate in the voting process
and 
 If casino is prohibited, however, there will be no income 
redistribution and the income/emotional benefit of group B will 
retain at the original level         
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 Suppose that there are already i persons in group A and j-1
persons in group B who will participate in the voting 
process, the possibility that the casino will be legalized (i.e., 
group B win) is
 The expected benefit of an extra person in group B when 
s/he participate or not
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 Consequently, the person will only participate in the 
process if
 The group leaders (i.e., the related governors) of group B 
need to choose j to maximize the group’s expected utility
max
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 The first order condition of group B’s maximization is given 
by
 Hence the equilibrium state is
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 Different from group B, individuals in group A concern more 
on the emotional/ethical benefits s/he can obtain from 
casino prohibition, and ignore the monetary benefit when 
casino is legalized
 Their utility on the expected income redistribution of casino 
legalization is zero
 They will obtain positive emotional benefit when casino is 
prohibited as they are strictly preferred casino prohibition to 
legalization.
and
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2.2 The anti-gaming group model
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 The expected benefit of an extra person in group A is
 Consequently, the extra person  will only participate in the 
process if
2. A public choice model
2.2 The anti-gaming group model
))(,( ˆ
0
iAAA
ctUjiP −+ )))(,(1(
îA
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 The governors who want to prohibit casino gaming will 
choose i to maximize the group’s expected utility
max
 The first order condition of group A’s maximization is 
 The equilibrium state is
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 If each voter involved in the casino legalization process can 
spend identical expenditures on political pressure and is 
weighted equally, the legislation result of casino gaming is 
then decided by the comparison of i and j
 If i>j, the anti-gaming group has more power to lobby the 
government and casino is more probably be prohibited
 If i<j, more individuals in the beneficiary group decided to 
participate in the process, casino may be legalized 
 Exemptions may exist when the beneficiary group can have 
more discourse power in the government through lobbying
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2.2 The anti-gaming group model
 It’s clear that the 
legislative result of 
casino gaming is 
more commonly 
relied on the 
government (i.e., 
legislative action) 
and the interest 
groups (i.e., local 
option vote)
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 However, the public choice is more probably departed from social
choice in casino legalization through legislative action
 Nevada legalized casino gaming in 1931 with legislative 
action to stimulate its economy 
 But the organized crime is flourished thereafter, and hence casino 
faced numerous pressures both from the community and from the 
federal government to be banned 
 It has continuous support from the state government and its legal 
status can be sustained
 The legislative action of casino legalization mainly demonstrates that 
the “small group” is able to press the government and hence the 
public choice
3. Evidences and discussions
 In 1974, the governors who support to legalize casino in 
Atlantic City placed a casino proposal, on the New Jersey 
general election ballot
 It would have permitted state-owned casino throughout the state
 The general public may still held a negative image to casino 
gaming 
 After their defeat in 1974, supporters of casino gaming 
placed another referendum in 1976 that would permit 
private-owned casino in Atlantic City only
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 It’s clear that the expected monetary benefit played a more 
concentrated role in deciding the casino legalization result, such as 
in the 1976 referendum, which may induce the departure of public
choice (e.g., casino legalization) from social choice (e.g., prevailed 
negative image of casino gaming)
 Nevertheless, if the expected benefit is not clearly stated, which 
may partly due to the absent of government signaling, the voting
taste/emotional concern turns to be the key factor and hence the
public choice (e.g., casino prohibition in the 1974 referendum) 
would be identical to the social choice
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 In 2009, Taiwanese government passed a new casino 
regulation, which stated that legalized casino can be built 
on offshore islands with the passage of local referendum
 Following this new regulation, Penghu was the first to hold a 
referendum on a tourist casino proposal in 2009, although it was
then defeated by the local voters.
 In 2012, however, Matsu proposed another casino plan and was 
able to be passed
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3.2 Taiwan’s case
 Penghu has a well-established infrastructure and 
industry base with abundant natural resources
 Nevertheless, because of the global financial tsunami, the local
government suffered from a financial deficit 
 Hence the government would like to legalize casino to foster the
economic growth by attracting tourisms and creating new jobs
 Matsu has a less developed infrastructure
 But its geographic advantage made it possible to attract Chinese
gamblers as a casino destination
 Different from Penghu, the referendum in Matsu stated clearly the 
community’s benefit from legalized casino 
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3.2 Taiwan’s case
 The two referendums in Penghu and Matsu indicated that, 
other than the expected benefit, the group size is also 
important in the progress of casino legalization 
 If the expected benefit can be spread more widely in the 
community, such as the case in Matsu, the beneficiary group’s size 
can be increased, which may provide a solid base for the potential 
supporters
 If, on the contrary, the expected benefit of casino gaming is 
concentrated on a certain group, as the case in Penghu, the 
majority may just comply the conventions to play against casino
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 With reference to public choice theory, especially the 
group’s voting behavior, this paper is able to formulate a 
theoretical framework on the progression of casino gaming, 
which is further examined by the experience in New Jersey 
and Taiwan.
 The progression of casino gaming represents a 
compromise of both monetary and non-monetary interests 
and their changes over time, instead of a sole economic 
consequence
4. Conclusions and remarks
 The motivation to participate in casino legalization process 
is varied across different groups 
 The beneficiary group, which includes the governors, the casino 
operators, the related tourism industries, etc, are mainly concerned 
with the direct economic benefit from casino gaming
 While the anti-gaming group, which is comprised of church groups, 
religious groups, local service industries, etc, are motivated, to a 
large scale, by the emotional and ethical concerns
4. Conclusions and remarks
 The experiences in New Jersey and Taiwan not only 
verified the aforementioned model, but also provided 
valuable policy suggestions
 It implied that it’s an efficient strategy for the government, 
especially for those countries that have a large religious people 
and conservatives, to state clearly the expected benefit of the 
mass community with casino legalization
 It’s evident that the more people aware what they will benefit from
casino gaming, the more support the government will have
 It’s crucial for the further researches to develop specific 
models, which is suitable to a given region, with reference 
to its specific characters
4. Conclusions and remarks
Thank you !
